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Introduction
Sovereign ratings not only are important for attracting   
private capital flows, but also act as widely available and in-
ternationally comparable indicators of a country’s fiscal per-
formance. A country’s sovereign rating provides a basis for 
international investors and bondholders to assess the risks 
of a country’s ability to honor its public debt obligations 
(Beers and Cavanaugh 2005; Lehmann 2004; Truglia and 
Cailleteau 2006). Assessments of sovereign creditworthi-
ness are also important for other types of resource flows, in-
cluding official aid (for example, performance-based aid al-
location by the U.S. Millennium Challenge Account) and 
concessional loans provided by multilateral and bilateral 
donors. 
Even when the sovereign government is not issuing bonds, 
the sovereign rating often acts as a “ceiling” for the foreign cur-
rency rating of bonds issued by firms and banks located in the 
country (Borensztein, Cowan, and Valenzuela 2007). There-
fore, the country rating acts as a benchmark for the interna-
tional capital market activities of the private sector. 
However, as of mid-2011, 58 developing countries are not 
rated by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch, the three in-
ternational rating agencies. Another 36 countries have had 
the same assigned rating since early 2009. Countries in the 
first group need their creditworthiness evaluated to improve 
their access to market-based international financing. Coun-
tries in the latter group need to have their current sovereign 
rating assessed to determine whether that rating is justified 
by current macroeconomic fundamentals or whether 
changes in the country’s policy or institutional variables 
might suggest an upgrade (or downgrade, as appropriate) of 
the existing rating. 
This premise presents an exercise to predict “shadow” sov-
ereign ratings to estimate where unrated countries would lie 
on the credit spectrum if they were rated.1 
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How Complementary Are Prudential Regulation and  
Monetary Policy? 
Otaviano Canuto
Monetary Policy , Asset Prices, and Finan-
cial Stability
Asset price cycles had been a concern for many years prior to 
the recent global financial crisis, but were seen as a separate is-
sue that was not a monetary policy concern. Even when the 
frequent appearance of asset price bubbles started to be ac-
knowledged, the belief was—“the Greenspan-Bernanke ap-
proach”1—that attempts to detect and prick them at an early 
stage would be impossible and potentially harmful. If neces-
sary, mopping up after the bubble burst would be safer, using 
interest rate cuts to help economic recovery.2
Low, stable inflation is a necessary and sufficient condition 
for stable growth with moderate unemployment. This condi-
tion could be pursued, among other ways, through an inflation 
targeting framework, using interest rates and clear communica-
tion rules to achieve a predefined inflation objective, as the sin-
gle focus for monetary authorities. Stable inflation would also 
result in low-risk premia, which combined with competition in 
financial markets would help achieve financial stability. The 
“Great Moderation” in developed economies, with relatively 
low inflation rates and small output fluctuations from the mid-
1980s onward, seems to vindicate this path. 
As is now known, this world of presumed stable monetary 
and financial conditions was severely shaken by the recent glob-
al financial crisis. With the benefit of hindsight, it is easy to 
draw lessons.  Asset price booms and busts were acknowledged 
to be both pervasive and harmful: real estate and stock market 
booms contributed to excess U.S. household debt and to fragile 
asset liability structures, the interconnectedness of financial 
firms’ balance sheets, and the danger of too-big-to-fail institu-
tions. The rapid global transmission of an asset price bust 
pushed the world economy to the edge of quasi-collapse (Ca-
nuto 2009).  
But was it lax monetary policy that led to the creation of 
these bubbles and then to financial instability? Some, such as 
Svensson (2010), say no. For them, the financial crisis was 
caused by factors other than monetary policy; monetary policy 
and financial stability policy are distinct–it was the latter that 
failed.3 
Could either monetary policy or financial prudential regulation be relied on individually to mitigate asset price cycles or 
their effects? If both ways are effective, monetary policy and prudential regulation could then be considered “substitutes,” in 
the sense that the individual use of either instrument leads to a reduction in the volatility of both corresponding targets. This 
note, however, argues in favor of complementarity—rather than substitution—in the use of monetary and macroprudential 
policies: the combined (articulate) use of both monetary and macroprudential policies and rules tends to be more effective 
than a standalone implementation of either.  
Shadow Sovereign Ratings
Otaviano Canuto, Sanket Mohapatra, and Dilip Ratha
Sovereign ratings are a necessary condition for countries to fully access international capital. Even if the sovereign 
government is not issuing bonds, the sovereign rating often acts as a “ceiling” for the private sector and can influence its 
international capital market access. However, 58 developing countries are still not rated by Standard & Poor’s, Moody’s, 
and Fitch, the three international credit rating agencies. This premise presents an exercise to predict “shadow” sovereign 
ratings to estimate where unrated countries would lie on the credit spectrum if they were rated. Contrary to popular 
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A Brief History of Sovereign  
Credit Ratings 
Sovereign credit ratings have existed for nearly a century. Two 
of the major rating agencies—Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s—
started rating sovereign Yankee bonds in the early 20th centu-
ry. By 1929, 21 countries were rated by Poor’s Publishing, the 
predecessor to Standard & Poor’s, including several of today’s 
emerging markets, such as Argentina, Colombia, and Uruguay 
(Bhatia 2002). Moody’s started rating debt instruments in 
1919, and within the next decade, it had rated bonds issued by 
about 50 governments (Cantor and Packer 1996). However, 
demand for ratings declined during the Great Depression, and 
most ratings were suspended following World War II. Rating 
activity for sovereigns resumed in the 1970s but at a signifi-
cantly slower pace until the 1980s. In 1980, eight high-income 
countries were rated by at least one of the three leading rating 
agencies. By the late 1980s, almost all the high-income Organ-
isation for Economic Co-operation and Development coun-
tries had been rated. 
Sovereign credit ratings for developing countries (as currently 
defined by the World Bank) began in the late 1980s after the sov-
ereign debt crises earlier that decade. The number of rated devel-
oping countries increased significantly during the 1990s emerg-
ing market phenomena. By April 2011, 135 countries—45 
high-income and 90 developing countries—were rated by at least 
one of the three agencies. Furthermore, sovereign ratings issued 
by different agencies tend to be highly correlated. The bivariate 
correlation coefficient between the ratings of the three agencies 
ranges from 0.97 to 0.99. For most developing countries, the rat-
ings are usually within one to two notches of one another. 
The Case for Predicting Shadow Ratings 
for Unrated Developing Countries
Most of the unrated countries need capital from international 
markets. Yet without a credit rating, those countries have dif-
ficulty accessing international bond markets and resort to 
costly relationship-based borrowing from commercial banks 
or to sales of equity to foreign direct investors. This scenario is 
especially true for subsovereign entities and private companies 
for which the sovereign rating acts as a ceiling (Canuto and Liu 
2010a, 2010b). Without a sovereign rating, such borrowers 
tend to be cut off from international credit markets. Thus, it is 
in the interest of all countries to obtain a credit rating even if 
the sovereign government does not need to borrow.
Why are so many countries not rated in the first place? Sev-
eral factors influence a country’s reluctance or inability to get 
rated. Countries are constantly reminded of the risks of cur-
rency and term mismatch associated with market-based foreign 
currency debt, as well as the possibility of sudden reversal of in-
vestor sentiment. The information required for the commercial 
rating process can be complex and not readily available in many 
countries. The institutional and legal environment that governs 
property rights and the sale of securities may be absent or weak, 
which prompts reluctance on the part of politicians to be pub-
licly judged by the rating analysts. Some countries find it dis-
couraging to request a rating, pay a fee for the rating, and then 
have no command over the final outcome. Basel capital ade-
quacy regulations that assign a lower risk weight (100 percent) 
to unrated entities than to those rated below BB− (150 percent) 
may also discourage borrowing entities from being rated. 
A Predictive Model for Sovereign Ratings
Many researchers have found that ratings by the major agencies 
are largely explained by a handful of macroeconomic variables 
(Cantor and Packer 1996; Canuto, dos Santos and de Sá Porto 
2004; Lee 1993; Ratha, De, and Mohapatra 2011; Rowland 
2005). Ferri, Liu, and Stiglitz (1999) and Mora (2006) used 
similar models to examine whether ratings were procyclical 
during the Asian crisis by comparing predicted with actual rat-
ings. Related literature has found that a small set of variables 
explains the likelihood of debt distress and defaults (Kraay and 
Nehru 2006; Reinhart, Rogoff, and Savastano 2003).2 
The first step in the empirical analysis is to convert the let-
ter long-term foreign currency rating from the three major 
agencies to a numerical equivalent (Bhatia 2002; Canuto, dos 
Santos, and de Sá Porto 2004). In the scale used for this exer-
cise (see table 1), 1 denotes the highest rating (corresponding 
to AAA for Standard & Poor’s and Fitch, Aaa for Moody’s) 
and 21 denotes the lowest rating (or C for all three agencies). 
Cases of sovereign or selective default are excluded in this re-
gression analysis because assigning a specific numeric rating 
to such extreme credit events is difficult. Although default or 
selective default appears to be just another step down the road 
of getting a rating downgrade, assigning a specific value to 
such an event would risk ignoring the degree of distress (for 
example, a temporary liquidity crisis versus a systemic crisis).
The next step is to estimate the numeric equivalent of sov-
ereign ratings for the rated developing countries as a function 
of macroeconomic variables, rule of law, debt and interna-
tional reserves, and macroeconomic volatility (as identified in 
the literature). A linear regression model of the data is pre-
sented in the following equation:
Sovereign rating = α + β1(log of GNI per capita) + β2(GDP 
growth rate) 
+ β3(Debt/Exports) + β4[Reserves/(Imports + Short-
term debt)] 
+ β5(Growth volatility) + β6 (Inflation) + β7(Rule of 
law) + error   (1)
Data for most of the right-hand variables are from the 
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the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook 
database, which are now publicly available. Data on short- 
and long-term claims are collected from the Bank of Interna-
tional Settlements. The rule of law variable is taken from a 
widely used dataset produced and updated by Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2009). The signs of the explanatory 
variables are in the expected direction and are significant at 
the 10 percent level or better (see Ratha, De, and Mohapatra 
2011). All the variables together explain about 80 percent of 
the variation in ratings for the regression sample.3 
Shadow Ratings for Unrated Developing 
Countries
This exercise uses the benchmark model to predict ratings for 
the unrated developing countries. The results are presented 
in the annex. Strikingly, the predicted ratings for the unrated 
countries do not all lie at the bottom end of the rating spec-
trum but are spread over a wide range (figure 1). 
Table 1. Sovereign Ratings: Conversion from Letter to Numeric Scale
Standard & Poor’s Fitch Moody’s Numeric grade
Investment grade
Highest credit quality AAA AAA Aaa 1
Very high credit quality AA+ AA+ Aa1 2
AA AA Aa2 3
AA− AA− Aa3 4
High credit quality A+ A+ A1 5
A A A2 6
A− A− A3 7
Good credit quality BBB+ BBB+ Baa1 8
BBB BBB Baa2 9
BBB− BBB− Baa3 10
Speculative grade
Speculative BB+ BB+ Ba1 11
BB BB Ba2 12
BB− BB− Ba3 13
Highly speculative B+ B+ B1 14
B B B2 15
B− B− B3 16
High default risk CCC+ CCC+ Caa1 17
CCC CCC Caa2 18
CCC− CCC− Caa3 19
Very high default risk CC CC Ca 20
C C C 21




























Figure 1. Distribution of Predicted Ratings
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
Note: The distribution is based on the lowest predicted rating. 4  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK    www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
Of 47 unrated countries from an original 55 unrated coun-
tries for which Ratha, De, and Mohapatra (2011) generated 
predicted ratings, 7 countries are likely to be investment grade, 
10 are likely to be in the BB category, 20 in the B category, and 
10 in the CCC or lower category. The countries just below the 
investment grade but at or above CCC are comparable to many 
emerging market countries with regular market access. For ex-
ample, in our analysis, Swaziland’s shadow rating from Stan-
dard & Poor’s ranges from B+ to BB, which puts the country in 
a similar bracket as Indonesia. Several other unrated develop-
ing countries (for example, Algeria, Bhutan, Djibouti, Equato-
rial Guinea, Maldives, and the Syrian Arab Republic) have 
shadow ratings in the B category or above.
While the predicted or shadow rating indicates the likeli-
hood of default on foreign currency debt obligations of the 
sovereign, it is not a predictor of whether the country will be 
successful if it were to issue an international bond. This is par-
ticularly true for small countries where volatility of economic 
growth and government revenue can be too high to render 
them unable to access private capital markets.4
Table 2 presents the shadow ratings for several countries 
that were rated since the estimates of Ratha, De, and Mohapa-
tra (2011) in early 2007. The predicted ratings are within one 
notch of the actual rating range for five of the seven countries. 
The difference between the predicted and actual ratings likely 
reflects improvement (or deterioration) in macroeconomic 
fundamentals during the intervening period. 
The model-based shadow ratings can provide a benchmark 
for evaluating unrated countries or rated countries that have 
not been rated for some time and might have improved suffi-
ciently to deserve an upgrade (or changed enough to require a 
downgrade). The shadow ratings also suggest a group of indi-
cators that developing countries can improve to achieve a 
higher sovereign rating. 
The international donor community can play a role in 
helping developing countries to obtain ratings. Such policy 
interventions have precedents. The United Nations Develop-
ment Programme partnered with Standard & Poor’s to rate 
eight African countries during 2003–06 (Standard & Poor’s 
2006), several of which have since accessed international cap-
ital markets to raise financing at a lower cost than the domes-
tic borrowing cost. 
Knowing the shadow ratings of unrated countries can also 
be helpful to bilateral and multilateral donors interested in 
setting up guarantees and other financial structures to reduce 
project risks and to mobilize private financing. One such in-
novative financing instrument that is being discussed is dias-
pora bonds to tap into the considerable wealth of the diaspora 
of developing countries (Okonjo-Iweala and Ratha 2011). 
These mechanisms can complement existing efforts to im-
prove aid effectiveness.
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Table 2. Comparison of Actual and Predicted Ratings for Ratings Issued after January 2007
Country Sovereign rating Date established Shadow rating (April 2011)
Angola B+ May 2010 B to B+
Bangladesh BB− to BB April 2010 B+
Belarus B March 2011 B+ to BB−
Gabon BB− November 2007  BB to BB+
Libya BB March 2011 BB+ or lower
Rwanda B August 2010 B to B+
Zambia B+ March 2011 BB
Sources: Authors’ calculations, Fitch, Moody’s, and Standard and Poor’s.5  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK    www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
Annex: Shadow Ratings for Unrated Countries, April 2011
Country Shadow rating (April 2011) Rated countries in a similar range
Algeria BB to BB+ Indonesia, Turkey
Bhutan BB− to BB Bangladesh; Venezuela, RB
Burundi C or lower Gambia, The; Malawi
Central African Republic CCC+ to B− Belize, Zambia
Chad CC to B Belize, Ecuador
Comoros CCC− to CCC+ Gambia, The; Malawi
Congo, Dem. Rep.  CCC− to CCC Gambia, The; Malawi
Congo, Rep.  B+ to BB− Guatemala, Uganda
Côte d’Ivoire B− or lower Ecuador, Pakistan
Djibouti B+ to BB− Guatemala, Uganda
Dominica BB+ to BBB Costa Rica, Croatia
Equatorial Guinea B+ to BB Dominican Republic, Paraguay
Eritrea CCC− to CCC Gambia, The; Malawi
Ethiopia B− to B Jamaica, Mali
Guinea C to CCC− Gambia, The; Malawi
Guinea-Bissau CCC+ to B Belize, Zambia
Guyana B+ to BB− Guatemala, Indonesia
Haiti B− to B Mali, Jamaica
Iraq B Honduras, Ghana, Burkina Faso
Kiribati* A+ China
Kyrgyz Republic CCC+ to B− Belize, Zambia
Lao PDR B− to B+ Argentina, Belarus
Liberia CCC+ to B Belize, Zambia
Maldives B+ to BB+ Latvia, Senegal
Marshall Islands* B− to B+ Jamaica, Mali
Mauritania B− to B Jamaica, Mali
Myanmar CCC+ to B− Belize, Zambia
Nepal CCC+ Gambia, The; Malawi
Niger B− to B+ Argentina, Belarus
Samoa BB+ to BBB Costa Rica, Croatia
São Tomé and Príncipe CCC or lower Gambia, The; Malawi
Sierra Leone CCC+ to B− Belize, Zambia
Solomon Islands* B− to B+ Jamaica, Mali
St. Kitts and Nevis* BBB+ to A Brazil, Panama
St. Lucia BBB− to A− Botswana, Panama
St. Vincent and the Grenadines BB+ to BBB Costa Rica, Croatia
Sudan CCC− to CCC+ Gambia, The; Malawi
Swaziland B+ to BB Dominican Republic, Indonesia
Syrian Arab Republic BB− to BB+ Uruguay, Vietnam
Tajikistan C to CCC Gambia, The; Malawi
Tanzania B+ Albania, Angola, Kenya
Togo B− to B+ Argentina, Belarus
Tonga* B+ to BB+ Colombia, Indonesia
Uzbekistan B to B+ Bolivia, Lebanon
Vanuatu BBB− to BBB+ Kazakhstan, Mexico
Yemen, Rep. B− to B Jamaica 
Zimbabwe CC to CCC− Gambia, The; Malawi
Source: Updated from Ratha, De, and Mohapatra 2011. 
Note: Shadow ratings for unrated countries marked with an asterisk (*) are from Ratha, De, and Mohapatra (2011). The model-based ratings should be treated as indicative; they are clearly not a 
substitute for the broader, deeper analysis and qualitative judgment employed by experienced rating analysts. The predicted ratings range is based on predictions for the benchmark models for Standard 
& Poor’s, Moody’s, and Fitch. Forecasts of explanatory variables for 2011 (as available in April 2011) were used to predict ratings for 2011. Predicted ratings for rated countries were also generated and 
are available upon request.6  POVERTY REDUCTION AND ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT (PREM) NETWORK    www.worldbank.org/economicpremise
Notes
1. The exercise follows an econometric model developed by 
Ratha, De, and Mohapatra (2011) that explains ratings as-
signed to developing countries by the three major rating agen-
cies. The shadow ratings are updated to the current year using 
International Monetary Fund and World Bank forecasts of 
explanatory variables for 2011. For a previous econometric 
exercise using fixed-effects methods, see Canuto, dos Santos, 
and de Sá Porto (2004).
2. Because most of the unrated countries (for which this exer-
cise predicts ratings) are also low-income countries, this exer-
cise has some similarities with that of Kraay and Nehru 
(2006). However, this exercise uses a continuous numeric 
scale for ratings and excludes cases of default in the regres-
sions, unlike the 0–1 dummy for debt distress used by Kraay 
and Nehru.
3. Ratha, De, and Mohapatra (2011) test the predictive power 
of this model using “within-sample” prediction. This exercise 
also exploits the high correlation across ratings assigned by 
the three agencies to test whether the predicted rating for one 
agency is similar to the actual ratings by other agencies.
4. The shadow ratings for some small economies seem unex-
pectedly high. Kiribati’s A+ rating is likely due to extraordi-
narily high reserves accumulated from earlier phosphate min-
ing revenues in a Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund. The 
high shadow ratings of Samoa and Vanuatu reflect high levels 
of international reserves which in turn depend on the contin-
ued availability of official aid.
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